Bush Deal with India: Hypocrisy, not Feathers

It’s official:

President Bush signed into law a nuclear deal with India today, reversing decades of U.S. policy by creating an India-only exemption that allows New Delhi to receive U.S. civilian nuclear technology even though it hasn’t signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This is terrible news for the international community. Somehow we have decided to set aside thirty years of a nuclear non-proliferation stance and allow New Delhi to be the “exception”. Well, exceptions won’t stand in today’s world–they become excuses and precedent for nations like North Korea and Iran to develop their own programs. And who are we to point fingers at Pyongyang while we cuddle up to India?

Don’t be surprised if the six-nation talks hit the wall this week.  And this time we can’t blame Kim Jong-Il’s irrationality. We have only ourselves to blame.

The truth of the matter is that this decision was purely strategic: India is our democratic friend, conveniently wedged between Communist superpower China and Fundamentalist Iran (and soon to be Pakistan?). The hypocrisy is overt, but somehow tragically justified. It seems that in today’s world, maintaining superpower status means bending the rules every so often. But then again, isn’t that always how it’s been?

 

China: Just as Screwed as America

Fascinating column in today’s Washington Post:

Despite its recent expressions of shock and horror — the Chinese government claimed last week to be “totally opposed” to the North Korean bomb — China still has more ways to influence North Korea than any other member of the U.N. Security Council. For that matter, China has more ways to influence North Korea than all of the members of the Security Council (and indeed the General Assembly) put together. Should China’s leaders want to see the North Korean regime fall, they don’t need to play around with sanctions or blockades. They could just cut off energy supplies to Pyongyang. Or food deliveries to Pyongyang. Or end all trade with Pyongyang.

Or, to make things even quicker and simpler, China could employ the same tactic that once upon a time led to the collapse of East Germany: Instead of closing the 800-mile Chinese-North Korean border to goods, the Chinese could open it, to people. According to U.S. government estimates , 10,000 to 30,000 North Korean refugees have slipped across the border in recent years and live illegally in China. According to some independent estimates , that number is closer to 300,000. Whatever the correct figure, it’s clear that a lot more would join them if the Chinese weren’t so vigilant about catching North Korean refugees and sending them back across the border to face torture and prison.

I completely concur, but I never considered this:

For not only is China the country with the most influence over North Korea, it is also, along with South Korea and Japan, one of the countries most under threat from North Korean nukes. After all, it is China, not the United States, that will be at the center of the new Asian arms race if Japan and South Korea feel compelled to get the bomb. It is China, not the United States, that would feel the effects of fallout if North Korea actually used its weapons. Although it isn’t clear whether North Korean missiles can reach Hawaii, it’s obvious that Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong are well within range. So shouldn’t this be China’s problem, not ours?

I always realized that China is the most crucial piece of the North Korean engagement puzzle, but I never for a moment considered the possibility of hostility between China and North Korea. Pyongyang’s rhetoric has always promoted the United States as the Imperialist enemy and China as a leading nation of the people. But with today’s deteroirating regime and even more paranoid policies, the danger is truly present that Kim might drastically coerce Beijing with an attack if support ceases. In the end this is a true indicator of North Korea’s isolation: in its desperate attempt to maintain its backward ways, it truly has alienated the world, including its staunchest ally.

It is therefore in China’s best interest to affirm itself as the dominant figure in the Sino-North Korean relationship and pressure Kim Jong-Il to rationally consider the consequences. Because if Kim is worried about a possible US attack on North Korea, they should be even more concerned about a Chinese strike, which would face little to no international protest or condemnation. This is reassuring news for America, bad news for Dear Leader.

 

What to do About North Korea

The Washington Post has a few thoughts. First, from former Secretary of Defense William Perry:

So what can be done now that might have a constructive influence on North Korea’s behavior? The attractive alternatives are behind us. There should and will be a U.N. resolution condemning the test. The United Nations may respond to calls from the United States and Japan for strong sanctions to isolate North Korea and cut off trade with it. But North Korea is already the most isolated nation in the world, and its government uses this isolation to its advantage. Stronger sanctions on materials that might be of use to the nuclear program are reasonable, but the horse is already out of the barn. Economic sanctions to squeeze North Korea would increase the suffering of its people but would have little effect on the elite. In any event, they would be effective only if China and South Korea fully participated, and they have shown no inclination to do so.

David Ignatius chipped in his two cents:

The Bush administration warned North Korea over and over that it would face severe consequences if it tested a nuclear weapon. So did China and Russia, but Kim Jong Il went ahead anyway. Iranian leaders are similarly unimpressed by Bush’s saber rattling, viewing America as a weakened nation bogged down by an unwinnable war in Iraq. To restore deterrence, the West needs to stop making threats it can’t carry out. And the United States must salvage its strategic position in Iraq — either by winning or organizing the most stable plan for withdrawal.

Two points arise from the recent events on the Korean Peninsula. The first is the futility of the discussed UN sanctions against North Korea, already the most isolated country in the world. The whole reason why the Dear Leader was able to develop the weapons in the first place was because he was ostracized by the world. Lets not throw gasoline on the fire: sanctions will only hurt the North Korean people, who have already suffered enough.

As for the second issue, the North Korean nuclear arsenal is a direct exposure of the failings of the Bush Doctrine abroad. Deterrence is possible only if the response is both plausible and appropriate. And with a hard-line, unreasoned rhetoric guiding US foreign policy for the past few years, the ultimate casualty of our hard-headedness has been our credibility. We threatened Iran with developing a weapons program, but allowed one to grow in North Korea. We angrily point fingers at Pyongyang and Tehran throws a fit. Ignatius highlights our international policy through “threats”, exemplifying our Texas gunslinger approach to international relations.

I’ve always said that if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. Well, our foreign policy is broke, and everyone knows it. Just a humble suggestion from a California college student to the Bush Administration: when “threats” become “incentives”, nations will not only comply, but will do so with a sense of eagerness that will resonate throughout the world.

 

Should We go to War with North Korea?

Fred Kaplan from Slate published this piece last week speculating on the possibility of war in the likely (and now real) event of a nuclear test:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have trotted out the war plans for North Korea during previous crises, most recently in 2003, and everyone in attendance concluded that the risks were too great. Kim Jong-il’s army has thousands of artillery pieces near the border, many within 50 miles of Seoul; a U.S. airstrike couldn’t get them all in the first wave; a retaliatory strike could kill hundreds of thousands of South Koreans. As for toppling Kim through invasion, the North Korean army is weak and poorly supplied, but it’s also huge (1 million men); the U.S. Army doesn’t have many spare troops at the moment, and the terrain from the DMZ to Pyongyang, in any event, is prohibitively rough.

Kaplan then reiterates a point I have made several times in past posts:

The Bush administration, from the outset, has resisted negotiations, on the principle that we should defeat evil, not negotiate with it—a fine moral point, except that we can’t do much to defeat this particular evil, and it might be more moral still to keep evil from going nuclear.

In the coming weeks, the Bush administration will—and should—do all it can to rally the regional powers, including China, to hold firm on threatening Kim Jong-il with severe economic penalties if he goes ahead with a nuclear test. This campaign would not be weakened—it might, in fact, be made more credible—if word went out to Pyongyang, even a backstage whisper, that there is a way out of this hole, that a deal is still possible. If Bush doesn’t offer an exit strategy, or if Kim doesn’t want to take it, the already frightening world is going to get scarier still.

This isn’t the time to talk about plans for war; this is the time for the international community to gather and put multilateral pressure on Pyongyang. Unfortunately, Kim Jong-Il does not respond well to criticism.

The most important piece in this entire nuclear puzzle is China, and their actions over the next few days in both the Security Council and diplomatically in Pyongyang will determine what will happen on the Korean Peninsula.

 

Coffee and North Korean Nukes–Great Way to Start your Week

Wonderful news out of North Korea:

South Korean government officials informed U.S. officials that the explosion, registering 3.58 on the Richter scale, had taken place at 10:36 p.m. EST Sunday. Minutes later, North Korea’s official KCNA news service announced the test, calling it “a historical event that has brought our military and our people huge joy.”

Renown for his impeccable timing, Kim Jong-Il selected quite a day to test his weapon:

Today’s test appeared timed to coincide with the ninth anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s appointment as head of the Korean Workers’ Party. And it came just one day before South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon will face a vote on his bid to become the next secretary general of the United Nations.

Here is the announcement issued by the North Korean Central News Agency. And I don’t think they’re lying; how often do earthquakes strike a nation who has been boasting an uncoming nuclear test for the past two weeks? This is no earthquake.

This is breaking news, so more will develop into the night. From what I understand the UN Security Council is planning an emergency meeting. South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has already ordered an emergency of his government’s National Security Council. Think chickens running with their heads cut off.

Obviously there is much consternation flowing through the international community at the moment. But the timing of this test could not have been more appropriate (or inappropriate, depending on your point of view). Newly appointed Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is in Seoul discussing this very issue after spending the past few days in Beijing doing the exact same thing. South Korean Ban Ki-Moon is soon to be elected secretary general of the United Nations.

We all knew it was a matter of time before North Korea had to “put its money where its mouth was”. We called their bluff, and they showed us their “rockets”, no pun intended. Amidst the many questions I have about dire security situation in the Far East, a random one arises: how is this going to affect the midterm elections? President Bush has been such a staunch hard-ass on the Iranian nuclear program that he neglected the sprouting nukes in Pyongyang. In an election where Republicans are basing their campaigns on national security, they now face a credible threat that had been allowed to fester in obscurity. Everybody has been pointing at Bin-Laden or Chavez, al-Zawahiri or Ahmadinejad. Amazing that Kim Jong-Il can be knocked out of the equation. It’s probably because nobody takes him seriously; over-sized aviator sunglasses and a jumpsuit will do that in 2006. But a nuclear weapon transcends any fashion fad–people have to look now.

Foleygate was bad enough for campaigning Republicans. But if this story is true, then GOP leaders are going to have a rude awakening on Monday morning. Drinking their coffee and reading the Washington Post, they’re all going to be thinking the same thing: “Kim Jong-Il just blew Foley out of the water”.

 

Bush’s Taepodong’d Problem

With all the talk about Iran and Iraq on the international stage, President Bush might have a bigger problem from the “pygmy” he so despises.

The Bush Administration has screwed up relations with North Korea yet again, as recent talk of impending sanctions have created a bitter atmosphere between Washington and Pyongyang. Yes, we have seen this already many times in the past and it’s simply indicative of the administration’s unskilled diplomacy and oblivious attitude toward Kim Jong-Il and his “failed” missiles.

A thought:

Some high in the Bush administration have argued that dangerous actions by North Korea are likely whether or not the United States undertakes new sanctions against Pyongyang. Perhaps so, but they are much more likely if, instead of carrot-and-stick negotiations, the administration withdraws all previous carrots and multiplies the sticks. In this case a U.S. administration will have to share the blame with North Korea if a new international crisis erupts.

Kim’s 4th of July launches were a warning to the international community, a foreshadow of the potential danger a nuclear Korean Peninsula could pose to stability in East Asia. The US had their chance, but instead the nation with the capability and position to engage the North chose instead to ignore the warning signals. Sanctions surely will do little to deter Kim Jong-Il; in fact, he’ll probably be encouraged by such aggressively legitimizing moves from the west. A successful nuclear test by North Korea could destabilize not only the region, but international politics as well. Before we argue that Al-Qaeda and Iranian militarism pose a greater threat to the United States, let’s remember that North Korea actually possesses the nuclear weapons we fear, and the capability to deliever the deadly payload to many large urban areas in Asia. In a day and age where nuclear non-proliferation is a top priority, the last thing the world needs is budding nuclear programs sprouting up in Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo.

North Korea was Bush’s chance to display some international credibility and charity through political rather than physical engagement. However, it looks like rock-headed decision making continues to slop out of the Pentagon, where tempers and impatience has taken precedent over rational thought and intellectual debate.

 

South Korea: Frozen in Time

There is a great piece in the New York Times today discussing South Korea’s seemingly skewed international perceptions. Some thoughts:

There are echoes here of a 2002 case in which a United States military truck killed two schoolgirls on a narrow country road. The driver’s acquittal by a court-martial led to weeks of protests and were a major factor in the election of President Roh Moo-hyun, who let it be known that he would not “kowtow” to Washington.

While the accident was a tragedy, one had to wonder why it could incite so many South Koreans to take to the streets while the daily death toll of North Korean children from famine and conditions in Mr. Kim’s gulags sparked no such protests.

It goes on:

To an outsider, South Koreans seem to have a double standard in terms of threat perceptions. Having been fed propaganda for years by military regimes that painted North Korea as an evil monster poised to devour them, they now seem to dismiss even factual claims as Cold War scare stories.

Many of them see North Korea as a slightly delinquent brother who needs to be cajoled into better manners. China, too, is viewed more positively than it is by most of its other neighbors. By contrast, American motives tend to be suspect, and wicked Japan can do nothing right. (The Roh administration’s first reaction to the North’s missile tests was not to condemn Mr. Kim but to criticize Japan for making “such a fuss.”)

I can see why South Koreans feel the way they do, but I still do not completely understand it. They are asserting themselves on an international level, proclaiming their independence from Washington. It’s correct to say the Cold War is over, and South Korea is trying to move on. But how can they, with the last vestige of true Communism across from the DMZ firing missiles and starving its citizens? It seems that they have voluntarily blinded themselves from reality, choosing to prosper and ignore the screams beyond their borders. How long can this go on for? South Korea can pretend the Cold War is over, but unfortunately, time has stood still on the Korean peninsula; it’s time to address these long-standing issues.

 

History to the Rescue in the Mid-East

Dave Broder’s column uses history to highlight the flaw in both Bush’s war in Iraq and Olmert’s war in Lebanon. He asks:

But once the hope for victory is gone, the issue remains: What do you do? The answer from Bush and from Olmert is: Carry on. Do not waver. And do not question the logic of prolonging the agony.

History suggests that is not always the right answer. The United States has failed to achieve victory in two of its recent wars — with very different results.

He goes on to refer to two past wars:

In Korea, we settled for a stalemate…North Korea remains a communist dictatorship, and its nuclear ambitions and missile development are a continuing problem for the United States and North Korea’s Asian neighbors…on the other hand, North Korea has not moved against South Korea for more than 50 years; the peace has held.

The other war was in Vietnam…it is hard to remember now, but at the time, we were told that if Ho Chi Minh prevailed, communism would roll south through Malaysia and spread to the Philippines and threaten Australia — to say nothing of American influence in the Pacific…and today the embassy is again open — in Hanoi — and the United States is trading freely with a united Vietnam.

Hindsight is always 20/20, but the similarities between those past proxy-wars and today’s conflicts are eerily similar; both fragments of greater ideological conflicts and directly or indirectly involving global or regional powers. But stubbornness by politicians cost the lives of thousands of American soldiers during two years of futile bloodshed along the 38th parallel during the Korean War from 1951-53 and even more lives during the Vietnam War following the Tet Offensive. The Vietnam War in particular symbolizes the horrible consequence of removed resolve: 36,000 of the war’s 58,000 of the war’s casualties occurred after military leaders deemed the war “lost” in 1968.

The administration needs to reassess it’s priorities and strategy in the Mid-East. Victory, or something like it, seems beyond our grasps at this point. The difficulty in the situation is altering our mindset, from substantial and tangible victory to hedging our bets. Our war in Iraq seems to be a sunk-cost, but that perhaps could only be a temporal result. Stability in the Middle East has been declared compromised by “terrorists”, as global stability was threatened by Communism. But if history has any lesson for us, it’s that past wounds heal faster than we expect.

I am not advocating for immediate withdrawal, because haste will cause more harm than good. However, I completely agree with Broder when he says that it’s time for America to reassess its priorities abroad. Maybe it’s time we asked ourselves how much is too much, what are we truly willing to sacrifice, and at what point do we grudgingly mutter “uncle”?

 

Snow: Good Faith not Effective in North Korea

Yesterday White House Spokesman Tony Snow criticized the Clinton Administration’s approach to North Korea:

Well, this is not the Clinton administration policy. I understand what the Clinton administration wanted to do. They wanted to talk reason to the government of Pyongyang, and they engaged in bilateral conversations. And Bill Richardson went with flowers and chocolates, and he went with light-water nuclear reactors, and he went with promises of heavy oil, and a basketball signed by Michael Jordan, and many other inducements for the “Dear Leader” to try to agree not to develop nuclear weapons, and it failed. But there was, at least, a good-faith effort on the part of some very smart people to use that as an approach.

We’ve learned from that mistake. One reason not to go bilateral with the North Koreans is what we’re seeing right now, which is that you need to have concerted pressure, especially from those who have very close and ongoing ties with the government of North Korea so that you can get results. So this is not a continuation of the Clinton program.

Read the simplistic critique here.

It seems to me that neither Mr. Snow nor the current administration are able to recognize a “good faith effort” towards Pyongyang. If believes that chocolates and a basketball signed by Michael Jordan are gifts to appease an erratic Kim Jong-Il, then he should definitely look at the historical track record of nuclear development in Korea thereafter.

1994-US and North Korea barely avoid armed conflict. Clinton realizes that a hardline approach won’t work. Negotiates, throws in promises of a few light-water reactors, which the north needed for power. Six years of cooperation follow. Normal relations almost established.

2000-Bush takes over as president of the United States of America. Hilarity ensues.

9/11/2001-Hilarity over, dark and oversimplistic time begins with the administration calling for the heads of all rogue states.

2002-Axis of Evil Speech. The new administration makes it perfectly clear that cooperation with North Korea no longer desired. Alienation of North Korea drives the state into a greater state of paranoia. Dear Leader orders the continuation of their missile project.

You wonder why we are at this current state? Cowboy gunslinging and gunboat diplomacy are going to lead us nowhere. And you wonder why things have gotten so out of hand? Mr. Snow, a good faith effort is more than a basketball or a box of sweets: its the concession of hard-headedness and jingoistic fervor in favor of reason and, ultimately, empathy.

 

China, Korea, and One Crazy Game of Poker

A great opinion column was published today in the Los Angeles Times about Sino-North Korean relations. The conclusion:

For it is China, not the United States, that has the power to decide the fate of North Korea. It is China that has consistently propped up the regime’s basket-case economy. It is China that has hitherto resisted calls from the U.S. and Japan for tougher action when Pyongyang has broken its word.

It might be thought that China gains little from having a madman as a neighbor and a dependant. Until now, however, it has suited Beijing quite well — better, at any event, than a North Korean collapse. Moreover, North Korea has been more than merely a buffer state. It has been a useful proxy, allowing China to probe the vulnerability of South Korea and Japan and to assert Chinese parity with the United States in matters of Asian security.

Read the rest here.

I think this guy has a great point but is underestimating the strategic alliance between North Korea and China. He is very right in saying North Korea is China’s proxy, but is he reading too much into China’s recent international comments regarding Kim Jong-Il’s regime?

China no doubt will be heavily influential in the coming weeks towards US-North Korean bilateral negotiations. And is it surprising? China has been and always is concerned with a stable Korean peninsula. With talk of an impending Japanese preemptive strike and the mobilization of the US Pacific fleet, China is even more pressed to pursue an agenda in Pyongyang.

China can explicitly state that it condemns the missile attacks, but I have a feeling that politicians in Beijing actually relish the July 4th launches. If anything, this is China’s way of indirectly asking the United States to take out its trash, to finish cleaning up the mess that had started more than sixty years ago. And in the process it is slyly driving a stake through the fragile alliance between Japan, South Korea, and the United States. A humanitarian crisis can be averted and a proxy state rebuilt, and conveniently out of Washington’s pocket.

China might seem concerned with the events surrounding North Korea, but international politics is one dangerous game of poker, and they might have something up their sleeve.

 

What’s for Dinner, Kim Jong-Il?

 

Bruce Cumming’s column in today’s New York Times is right on the money. His conclusion:

So what led the North Koreans to remind the West of its missiles? Perhaps it was President Bush’s announcement in May that the administration would negotiate directly with Iran over its nuclear program — a move that led the North Koreans to call for talks of their own with the United States. In this light, North Korea’s missile brinkmanship is not intended to scare us. Rather, in the ham-handed way that is Pyongyang’s specialty, it is meant to invite Washington to make a deal.

Remember Madeline Albright’s visit to Pyongyang? Albright visited North Korea and dined with the bad boy himself, and almost achieved the diplomatic breakthrough that US-North Korean relations have not had since…well, ever.

Sometimes I’m so overwhelmed with events and policies by the current administration that I lose sight of the greater track record of American political history. Scope, it seems, is occasionally obscured by emotion.

The reason why I say this is because, throughout all of this saber-rattling in the Far East (which is getting to the point where the sabers are about to be drawn), maybe President Bush should look back to his predecessor’s approach to the Stalinist state. Clinton’s approach to North Korea was novel, for it evolved from missiles and bombs, like the current approach, to good faith and diplomacy.

I do not speak on behalf of Kim Jong-Il or North Korea, but maybe this is their very peculiar way of inviting someone from the current administration to dinner.

 

North Korea adds to the Fireworks Celebration

Fresh off the wire: North Korea, after a couple weeks of tense anticipation, finally tested its taepodong-2 missile along with five others. Read the story here.

I have a feeling that, at the moment, Bush is stressful consulting his cabinet, upset at the inopportune timing of the launch (amidst our own fireworks no less), and Kim Jong-Il is sitting in his palace, listening to Jimmy Cliff’s “I can see clearly”, knowing he finally created the international crisis he so desperately desired.

I had previously described my theory of why Kim is pursuing this current agenda, read it here.

To reiterate a past point, I am very interested to see how Bush deals with this issue. Amidst the international outcry, perhaps this is his moment to take the moral high ground (if such thing exists amidst a Realist world) and finally engage Pyongyang.

 

Still looking for those WMD’s in Iraq?

There is a word for this: “denial”

 

Update from the Korean Peninsula

Today's Washington Post has an editorial piece by former Secretary of Defense William Perry, proposing a preemptive strike on North Korea:

Should the United States allow a country openly hostile to it and armed with nuclear weapons to perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of delivering nuclear weapons to U.S. soil? We believe not.

….Therefore, if North Korea persists in its launch preparations, the United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before it can be launched. This could be accomplished, for example, by a cruise missile launched from a submarine carrying a high-explosive warhead.

….In addition to warning our allies and partners of our determination to take out the Taepodong before it can be launched, we should warn the North Koreans. There is nothing they could do with such warning to defend the bulky, vulnerable missile on its launch pad, but they could evacuate personnel who might otherwise be harmed.

Read the rest here.

I have a lot of problems with this article, and while people praise Secretary Perry and respect his proposals, I believe his recommendations outlined in this column are misguided. This is something I will probably address on Monday's column, so stay tuned.

 

Report from Pyongyang: Launch in T-24 Hours

Reports from Korean, Japanese, and US military intelligence reports that North Korea has fueled its newest rocket, the taepodong-2, capable of reaching the West Coast of the United States.

Here's the story from the New York Times.

Some analysis:

Moreover, this New York Times article indicates that the United States is conducting secret talks with the North Korean regime, attempting to dissuade them. One can only hope that talk of "incentives," similar to the six-party talks, is markedly absent from the current discussion. After all, one knows what those 'incentives' are: money, mostly, and possibly a peace treaty. Both of these options are undesirable where a holocaust state such as North Korea is concerned.

As this goes to press – , er, . . .'server,' it's just approaching 9:00 pm here on the Korean peninsula. It's been about 24 hours since the North Korean regime loaded their Tapedong-2 missile with fuel, meaning that only about 24 more hours of shelf-life remain. So, come on 'Dear Leader' Kim, just try it.

Keep it up, sir, and the UN may finally finish the job that it started in the early 1950s.

Read the rest here.

Those of you who have read anything off the wire recently are aware of the fact that once the taepodong-2 rocket has been fueled it has about a 24 hour shelf life before it starts to decompose from the inside. What does this mean? Well, the North Koreans have already fueled their little toy, expect to hear a statement from Pyongyang and the ensuing political fireworks within the next day.

Why is Kim Jong-Il stirring the bee-hive that is East Asia? Probably because he is trying to gain political leverage in the six-party talks. Or it could be because he wants to send a message to the United States of their sincerity and seriousness.

I think it has to do with international attention: with the spotlight on Iran, Iraq, and Somalia, North Korea has become nothing more than an obscure blip on the radar screen, forcing Kim Jong-Il has to resort to drastic measures to remain in the larger global picture.

How did Kim Jong-Il begin to receive international aid and political engagement manifested in the six-party talks to begin with? The same way, by firing a missile over Japan. North Korea has become an international pirate, but as unruly we perceive the Stalinist state to be, we must grudgingly applaud Kim Jong-Il's shrewed political move. Kim Jong-Il got what he wanted last time by coercion and deception; why won't it work this time around

I guess if it ain't broke, don't fix it. 

This is an unfortunate bi-product of global priority, of skewed foreign policy and confused priority. But the tragedy of this situation is that in the end, North Korea's contribution to the global community is limited to the test of destructive weapons in circus-like fashion and not any benign discoveries that can benefit mankind as a whole.